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INTRODUCTION

n employee of a painting contractor goes to the local hardware
store and purchases a standard extension ladder for her
employer. The employee takes the ladder to the job site and
other employees of the painting contractor use the ladder daily to complete
their work. Later that week, an inspector from the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) arrives on the job site and inspects the
operation.
The painting contractor passes the inspection with flying colors until,
much to the contractor's surprise, the inspector pulls out her tape measure
and begins measuring the distance between the rungs of the newly
purchased ladder. The inspector pulls the tape eleven, twelve, and finally
thirteen inches between the rungs. She draws her clipboard and writes the
employer a citation for a "non-serious" safety violation. The contractor
questions the inspector on the reason for the citation and the inspector,
acting under the direction of the Secretary of Labor, explains that the
contractor violated a published OSHA safety standard allowing twelve
inches as the maximum distance between ladder rungs. OSHA imposes a
penalty of $250 and requires immediate abatement of the safety violationmeaning that the contractor must either stop using the ladder and buy one
that complies with the published regulatory standard, or find a way to move
each ladder rung in by one inch.1
The employer in the above scenario has the statutory right to contest
the citation. If the employer does so, the case will be heard by an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)under the purview of the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC or Commission).2 An
OSHA official, acting under the direction of the Secretary of Labor,
functions as prosecutor. The Secretary may as a function of prosecutorial
discretion conclude that, although the contractor had technically violated a
safety standard, the violation poses no real hazard to employees, 3 and it
therefore should be reclassified as a de minimis4 violation requiring no

1. This hypothetical is derived from a hypothetical provided by the Secretary of
Labor's guidelines for determining de minimis cases. See Donovan v. Daniel Constr. Co.,
692 F.2d 818, 821 (1st Cir. 1982).
2.
29 U.S.C. § 661 (1994).
3.
29 U.S.C. § 655 (1994).
4.
The phrase "de minimis" comes from the phrase "de minimis non curat lex"
which translates as "the law cares not for trifles". See Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v.
Wrigley, 505 U.S. 214, 231 (1992).
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penalty or abatement. It is possible, however, for the violation to be
classified as de minimis even over the Secretary's objection. This may
occur if the OSHRC, acting either directly on appeal from the ALJ's
decision or indirectly by declining review of the ALJ's decision, finds that
a violation has occurred but that the violation should be classified as de
minimis.5 This creates a problem because the Secretary has argued that
only the6 Secretary has the statutory authority to label a charge as de
minmis.
The federal circuits are split on the issue of whether the OSHRC has
the authority to label a safety and health violation de minimis and require
no abatement even if the Secretary of Labor has issued a citation. Four
Circuits hold that the OSHRC possesses this authority.7 One other Circuit8
and the Secretary of Labor 9 disagree, and have concluded that once the
Secretary issues a citation, the Commission may not designate the violation
de minimis and require no abatement. They believe this would transfer the
Secretary's prosecutorial discretion to the Commission contrary to the
provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act or
Act). l°
This article argues that the OSHRC possesses the statutory authority
to designate a safety and health violation de minimis and to require no
abatement even if the Secretary of Labor has issued a citation. Part I of this
article examines the legislative background of the OSH Act," its
procedural aspects, the separate prosecutorial and adjudicative roles the Act
places on the Secretary of Labor and the OSHRC respectively, the three
severity levels of violations, and the Commission's authority to determine
the level of severity of a violation. Part IIdiscusses the current split in the
Federal Circuit Courts. Part III analyzes the issue of whether the OSHRC
possesses the statutory authority to designate a safety and health violation
de minimis. It concludes that the OSHRC does possess the authority to
label a safety and health violation de minimis and to require no penalty or
abatement, even though an OSH Act violation has technically occurred.

5.

29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1994).

11.

Id.

6.
See Reich v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 998 F.2d 134,
138 (3d Cir. 1993).
7.
See Donovan v. Daniel Constr. Co., 692 F.2d 818, 821 (1st Cir. 1982); Erie
Coke Corp., 998 F.2d at 135; Chao v. Symms Fruit Ranch, Inc., 242 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir.
2001); Phoenix Roofing, Inc. v. Dole, 874 F.2d 1027, 1031-32 (5th Cir. 1989).
8. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Herman, 131 F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 1997).
See Reich, 998 F.2d at 138.
9.
10.
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994).
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I. BACKGROUND

A. THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF

1970

A little over three decades ago, Congress, acting under its authority to
13
provide for the general welfare 2 and to regulate interstate commerce,
enacted the OSH Act of 1970.14 Congress passed this Act to assure every
worker in the nation safe and healthful working conditions, and to preserve
the nation's human capital.' 5
Congress wanted to decrease the number and severity of work-related
injuries and illnesses that were occurring despite the efforts of employers
and the government to reduce or eliminate them.16 Congress sought to
achieve this purpose by authorizing the Secretary of Labor to promulgate
and develop occupational safety and health standards,' 7 and to apply them
uniformly to employers and employees.' 8 Two policies underlie the
justification for creating and administering these uniform standards. First,
Congress wanted to reduce human suffering, disability, and death.' 9
Second, Congress wanted to counter the economic impacts 20 of industrial
deaths, injuries, and occupational illnesses resulting from emerging
technologies and new processes in industry that continually introduced new
hazards to workers.2 1

12.
U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 1.
13.
U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3.
14.
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994).
15.
Id. § 651.
16.
See S. Rep. No. 91-1282, at 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177.
17.
29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(9) (1994).
18.
See id. § 651(b)(10); see also S. Rep. No. 91-1282, at 1 (1970), reprinted in
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177.
19.
See S. Rep. No. 91-1282, at 2 (1970), reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5178.
20.
See 29 U.S.C. § 651(a) (1994) ("personal injuries and illnesses arising out of
work situations impose a substantial burden upon, and are a hindrance to, interstate
commerce in terms of lost production, wage loss, medical expenses, and disability
compensation payments.").
21.
See id.
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B. THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH ACT OF 1970

The OSH Act authorizes the Secretary of Labor to set and enforce
mandatory occupational safety and health standards.22 The Secretary
creates these standards by exercising its rulemaking 23 powers. 24 If the
Secretary (or her designee), after investigation (usually an on-site
inspection), finds that an employer has violated a safety or health standard,
2
25
impose a fine,26 and require the
the Secretary can issue a citation,
27
employer to abate the violation.
An employer may contest a citation issued by the Secretary,28 and the
OSHRC, an adjudicatory agency, must give the employer an evidentiary
hearing and "thereafter issue an order, based on findings of fact, affirming,
modifying, or vacating the Secretary's citation or proposed penalty, or
directing other appropriate relief.' '29 This hearing is conducted before an
ALJ, who makes an initial determination of the merits of contested
citations. Unless the OSHRC decides to review the decision, the ALJ's
ruling becomes the Commission's final order.3° Finally, both the Secretary
of Labor and the adversely affected employer can seek review of an
unfavorable Commission order in a United States Circuit Court, and on
appeal, the court must adopt as conclusive any of the31Commission's
findings of fact that are "supported by substantial evidence."

22.
Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 147
(1991); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 651(b)(3), 659 (1994).
23.
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the issuance of a federal
regulation is called "rulemaking." Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559
(1994).
See 29 U.S.C. § 665 (1994); see also Martin, 499 U.S. at 147.
24.
25.
29 U.S.C. § 658 (1994).
26.
Id. § 666; see also Martin, 499 U.S. at 147.
27.
29 U.S.C. § 658.
28.
Id. § 659(c) (1994).
29. Martin, 499 U.S. at 148 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 659(c)).
30.
See 29 U.S.C. § 6610) (1994); see also Martin, 499 U.S. at 148.
31.
Martin, 499 U.S. at 148 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 660(a)-(b)).
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C. THE LEGISLATIVE, PROSECUTORIAL AND ADJUDICATIVE ROLES OF THE
SECRETARY AND THE OSHRC

1. The Legislative Role of the Secretary of Labor
32
The OSH Act employs an atypical regulatory structure.

Most

regulatory structures merge rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicative
functions into one administrative authority.3 3 Conversely, the OSH Act
divides rulemaking and enforcement authority from adjudicative authority
and allocates these roles respectively to the Secretary of Labor and the
OSHRC.34
Under the OSH Act, the Secretary acts in its legislative capacity by
35
developing and promulgating workplace safety and health standards. The
Secretary also can make authoritative interpretations of occupational safety
and health regulations as a "necessary adjunct" of the Secretary's powers to
develop and to enforce OSH Act standards.36 If the interpretation of a
safety and health standard by the Secretary and the OSHRC conflict, 37a
interpretation."
reviewing court must "defer to the Secretary's reasonable
The Secretary's interpretation of the safety regulation, however, receives
deference only if it is reasonable.38 A Secretary's interpretation "is
as it is not 'arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary
reasonable so long
39
to the statute.'

'

See Martin, 499 U.S. at 151.
32.
See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2000); 15 U.S.C. §§
33.
77(s)-77(u) (2000); 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994)); see also Martin, 499 U.S. at 151; Reich v.
Erie Coke Corp., 998 F.2d 134, 137 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Martin, 499 U.S. at 150).
See Martin, 499 U.S. at 151.
.34.
See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(9) (1994).
35.
Martin, 499 U.S. at 152.
36.
Chao v. Symms Fruit Ranch, Inc., 242 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting
37.
Herman v. Tidewater Pac., Inc., 160 F.3d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Martin, 499
U.S. at 157-58)).
See Symms FruitRanch, 242 F.3d at 897 (citing Martin, 499 U.S. at 158).
38.
Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Nat. Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
39.
837, 844 (1984)).
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2. The ProsecutorialRole of the Secretary of Labor
The OSH Act charges the Secretary of Labor with enforcing
occupational safety and health standards, 40 and the Secretary possesses the
sole authority to decide whether to prosecute a violation of the OSH Act.41
The OSH Act expressly gives the Secretary prosecutorial discretion to
determine whether to issue a citation for an OSH Act violation or to issue a
notice in lieu of a citation for certain de minimis violations42-"violations
which have no direct or immediate relationship to safety or health., 4 3 The
OSH Act gives the Secretary discretion, much like that of a criminal
prosecutor, to determine whether to charge a suspected wrongdoer with a
violation of a law, drop the charges altogether, 44 or issue a notice in lieu of
a citation for certain de minimis violations, much like a waming.45
3. The Adjudicative Role of the OSHRC
The OSHRC carries out adjudicatory functions under the OSH Act. 6
An employer may contest a citation issued by the Secretary, and the
Commission must give the employer an evidentiary hearing and "thereafter
issue an order, based on findings of fact, affirming, modifying, or vacating
the Secretary's citation or proposed penalty, or directing other appropriate
relief.",47 An ALJ holds the evidentiary hearing and makes initial
determinations regarding contested citations. Unless the OSHRC grants
discretionary review, the AL's decision becomes the Commission's final
order. 8 This final order is appealable to the United States Court of
Appeals. 9

40.
29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1994).
41.
See Reich v. Erie Coke Corp., 998 F.2d 134, 137 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing
Cuyahoga Valley Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 474 U.S. 3, 5 (1985)).
42.
See id. at 137-38.
43.
Id. at 138.
44.
See Cuyahoga Valley Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 474 U.S. 3, 6-7 (1985).
45.
See generally Chao v. Symms Fruit Ranch, Inc., 242 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir.
2001).
46.
29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3) (1994); see also, Martin v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 147 (1991).
47.
29 U.S.C. § 659(c); see also Martin, 499 U.S. at 148.
48.
See 29 U.S.C. § 6610); see also Martin, 499 U.S. at 148.
49.
Martin, 499 U.S. at 148 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 660(a)-(b) (1994)).
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D. THE DISAGREEMENT ON THE LEVELS OF SEVERITY ESTABLISHED BY THE
OSH ACT

Since the inception of the OSH Act in 1970, the Secretary of Labor,
the courts, and the OSHRC have interpreted the Act as classifying
occupational safety and health violations into three distinct categories:
serious, non-serious, and de minimis.5 ° This categorization scheme

developed primarily from the courts' and Commission's interpretation of

the OSH Act. 51 The Secretary of Labor acquiesced in those three
classifications until 1993, when Secretary Robert Reich experienced a
Damascene conversion 52 and decided that, despite his predecessor's
twenty-year acquiescence to these classifications, he now viewed the de
of the
minimis classification as merely a preliminary charging decision
53
Secretary over which the OSHRC has no independent authority.

See Reich v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 998 F.2d 134,
50.
138 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Phoenix Roofing, Inc. v. Dole, 874 F.2d 1027, 1031 (5th Cir.
1989) (stating that violations of the OSH Act may be designated as serious, not serious and
de minimis); Fluor Constructors, Inc., v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
861 F.2d 936, 942 (6th Cir. 1988) (concluding the OSH Act establishes three levels of safety
violations-serious, non-serious and de minimis); Donovan v. Daniel Constr. Co., 692 F.2d
818, 820-21 (1st Cir. 1982) (stating the OSH Act establishes three severity levels of safety
violations-serious, non-serious and de minimis in decreasing order of seriousness);
Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011, 1019 n.10 (7th Cir. 1975) (declaring
the OSH Act provides three levels of severity for safety violations depending on the "level
of gravity" of the violation-de minimis, non-serious, and serious); Brennan v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 494 F.2d 460, 463 (8th Cir. 1974) (stating the OSH Act
establishes three levels of severity of safety violations, serious, non-serious, and de
minimis)).
See Reich, 998 F.2d at 138.
51.
Acts 9:1-8 (King James).
52.
See Reich, 998 F.2d at 140 (Becker, J., dissenting) (stating that he agreed with
53.
the Secretary's interpretation that the OSH Act establishes only two severity levels of safety
violations for adjudicatory purposes-serious and not serious). It is noteworthy that the
court in Reich pointed out that Secretary Reich admitted in his brief that in Donovan v.
Daniel Constr. Co., 692 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1982), his predecessor, then Secretary of Labor
Raymond J. Donovan, conceded that the OSHRC had the power to classify certain
violations as de minimis. See Reich, 998 F.2d at 138-39.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 22-3

The OSHRC, the Secretary of Labor and the courts unanimously agree
that Congress intended to create at least two severity levels under the OSH
Act-serious and non-serious.54 However, statutory ambiguity arguably
exists concerning whether Congress intended to establish a third severity
level for occupational safety and health violations, the de minimis
classification.5 5 Congress expressly defined serious violations within the
56
Occupational Safety and Health Act.

54.
See Reich, 998 F.2d at 138; Phoenix Roofing Inc. v. Dole, 874 F.2d 1027, 1031
(5th Cir. 1989); Fluor Constructors, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
861 F.2d 936, 942 (6th Cir. 1988); Donovan v. Daniel Construction Co., 692 F.2d 818, 82021 (1st Cir. 1982); Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011, 1019 n.10 (7th
Cir. 1975); Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 494 F.2d 460, 463
(8th Cir. 1974); see also Reich, 998 F.2d at 140 (Becker, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the
Secretary's interpretation that the OSH Act establishes two levels of severity of safety
violations for adjudicatory purposes-serious and not serious).
55.
Compare Reich, 998 F.2d at 138, with Erie Coke Corp., 998 F.2d at 140
(Becker, J., dissenting).
56.
The portion defining serious violation states:
(k) Determination of serious violation
For purposes of this section, a serious violation shall be deemed to exist
in a place of employment if there is a substantial probability that death
or serious physical harm could result from a condition which exists, or
from one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes
which have been adopted or are in use, in such place of employment
unless the employer did not, and could not with the exercise of
reasonable diligence, know of the presence of the violation.
29 U.S.C. § 666(k) (1994).
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However, while Congress explicitly provided for citations and
5
monetary penalties for both serious 57 and non-serious safety violations, "
Congress failed to explicitly define non-serious safety violations. 59
Congress created further uncertainty concerning the number of severity
levels it intended to create under the OSH Act by placing the Act's only
reference to de minimis violations in a separate section of the Act
concerned primarily with the Secretary of Labor's prosecutorial charging
discretion. 6°
The Secretary of Labor argues that the OSH Act creates only two
severity levels for health and safety violations-serious and non-seriousand that the de minimis classification is merely a preliminary charging
decision under the Secretary's sole discretion.6' The OSHRC argues that
the OSH Act creates three severity levels for health and safety violationsserious, non-serious, and de minimis.62 If the Secretary's construction of
the Act is accepted, then once an employer is cited for a serious or nonserious safety or health violation, the Commission lacks the statutory
authority to designate the violation de minimis and must require the
employer to abate the violation. If the OSHRC's construction is accepted,

57.

The penalty for serious violations is as follows:
(b) Citation for serious violation

Any employer who has received a citation for a serious violation of the
requirements of section 654 of this title, of any standard, rule, or order
promulgated pursuant to section 655 of this title, or of any regulations
prescribed pursuant to this chapter, shall be assessed a civil penalty of
up to $7,000 for each such violation.
29 U.S.C. § 666(b) (1994).
The penalty for non-serious violations is as follows:
58.
(c) Citation for violation determined not serious
Any employer who has received a citation for a violation of the
requirements of section 654 of this title, of any standard, rule, or order
promulgated pursuant to section 655 of this title, or of regulations
prescribed pursuant to this chapter, and such violation is specifically
determined not to be of a serious nature, may be assessed a civil penalty
of up to $7,000 for each such violation.
29 U.S.C. § 666(c) (1994).
See Reich v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 998 F.2d 134,
59.
142 (3d Cir. 1993) (Becker, J., dissenting).
See 29 U.S.C. § 658(a); see also Erie Coke Corp., 998 F.2d at 141-42 (Becker,
60.
J., dissenting).
See Reich, at 138-39 (disagreeing with the Secretary's interpretation of the OSH
61.
Act); see also id. at 141-42 (Becker, J., dissenting).
See Reich, 998 F.2d at 138 (discussing the Commission's interpretation of the
62.
Act).
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then the OSHRC has the authority (either independently or through an
ALJ) to designate a violation de minimis overthe Secretary's objection.
E. THE COMMISSION'S AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE SEVERITY LEVEL OF
A SAFETY VIOLATION

The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) is
authorized to determine the severity level of an occupational safety and
health violation.63 Under the OSH Act, after the Secretary issues a citation
and assesses a penalty, the adversely affected employer may contest the
citation to the OSHRC. 64 The Commission is then authorized to afford the
employer a hearing in front of an AL, and the Commission "shall
thereafter issue an order, based on findings of fact, affirming, modifying, or
vacating the Secretary's citation or proposed penalty, or directing other
appropriate relief .... ,,6
Thus, under the OSH Act, the Commission is viewed as a "neutral
arbiter" charged with authoritative fact finding and the mandate to apply
the Secretary's standards to the facts in rendering decisions.66 The
Commission's power to determine the severity level of a violation falls
within that grant of power, and even those questioning the Commission's
adjudicatory power admit that, traditionally, the Commission has been seen
as possessing the adjudicative power to determine the level of severity of a
67
safety and health violation.
II. THE UNEVEN SPLIT IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS

Currently, the federal circuit courts are unevenly split on the issue of
whether the OSHRC possesses the authority to label a safety and health
violation de minimis and require no abatement or monetary penalty even if

63.
See Donovan v. Daniel Constr. Co., 692 F.2d 818, 820 (1st Cir. 1982) ("[Ihf
judicial review is sought, the appellate court may not disturb the factual findings of the
Commission as to the existence or severity of worksite violations if those findings are
supported by substantial evidence .. ") (emphasis added) (citing Modem Drop Forge Co.
v. Sec'y of Labor, 683 F.2d 1105, 1109 (7th Cir. 1982)); Cape & Vineyard Div. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 512 F.2d 1148, 1153 (1st Cir. 1975).
64.
29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1994).
65.
Id.
66.
See Reich v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 998 F.2d 134,
139 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 499
U.S. 144, 154 (1991)).
67.
See Reich, 998 F.2d at 141 (Becker, J., dissenting).
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the Secretary of Labor has issued a citation. Four federal circuit courts that
have addressed the issue have held that the OSHRC possesses this
authority.68 However, one other circuit court 69 and the Secretary of Labor
disagree. 70 They have concluded that once the Secretary issues a citation,
the Commission may not designate the violation de minimis and require no
abatement or monetary penalty. Both views will be discussed in turn.
A. THE MAJORITY VIEW OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS

In Chao v. Symms FruitRandh Inc.,71 the Ninth Circuit held that the
OSHRC possesses the authority to conclude that even though a safety
standard has been technically violated, the violation was de minimis and no
penalty should be imposed upon the employer. 72 In 1997, an OSHA
investigator inspected Symms Fruit Ranch in Idaho and cited Symms for a
serious violation.7 3 The inspector cited Symms for violating an OSHA
regulatory standard by using a John Deere tractor with an unguarded rear
power take-off shaft, and OSHA imposed a fine.74
Symms contested the citation, and the ALJ ruled that Symms had
indeed violated a published OSHA regulation 75 that requires tractors to
have guards on their rear power take-off shafts.76 However, the ALJ
concluded that because the exposed shaft was partially guarded, was not
engaged for its present purpose, and was nearly impossible to accidentally
engage, the violation of the standard did not pose a true hazard to
employees and bore merely a "negligible relationship to employee safety or

68.
See Donovan v. Daniel Constr. Co., 692 F.2d 818, 821 (1st Cir. 1982); Reich,
998 F.2d at 135; Chao v. Symms Fruit Ranch, Inc., 242 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2001); see
also Phoenix Roofing Inc. v. Dole, 874 F.2d 1027, 1031-32 (5th Cir. 1989) (concluding that
a violation of a safety standard can be classified as de minimis resulting in a finding that
even though technically a violation occurred, that no penalty should be assessed and no
abatement is necessary).
69.
See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Herman, 131 F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 1997).
70.
See Reich, 998 F.2d at 138.
71.
Symms FruitRanch, 242 F.3d at 898.
72.
Id.
73.
Id. at 896.
See id.
74.
See id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1928.57(b)(1)(i) (2001), which regulates farming
75.
equipment and provides that "[a]ll power take-off shafts, including rear, mid or sidemounted shafts shall be guarded either by a master shield, as provided in paragraph
(b)(1)(ii) of this section, or by other protective guarding.").
76.
Chao v. Symms Fruit Ranch, Inc., 242 F.3d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 2001).
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health ....
',7 Thus, the ALJ reclassified the violation as de minimis, threw
78
and did not require Symms to abate the violation.
fine,
the
out
The Secretary of Labor petitioned the Commission for an79
administrative appeal, but no member of the Commission directed review.
Thus, the AL's decision became the OSHRC's final decision.80 The
Secretary then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit for review of the Commission's decision, arguing that the
Commission lacked the authority to reclassify a violation as de minimis and
require no fine or abatement.8 '
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that since the OSH Act
authorizes the Commission to "issue an order ...affirming, modifying, or
vacating the Secretary's citation or proposed penalty, or directing other
appropriate relief," 82 the provision allowing the Commission to direct
"other appropriate relief' gave the Commission authority to reclassify a
violation as de minimis and require no monetary penalty or abatement.8 3
The Ninth Circuit analogized the Commission's authority to the power of a
criminal court to reduce a criminal offense to a lesser one than the offense
charged in the indictment, stating that reducing a violation to the de
minimis level "falls within the Commission's statutory prerogatives of
effectively vacating the citation or 'directingother appropriaterelief. 84
Like the Ninth Circuit in Symms Fruit Ranch, 5 the Third Circluit has
held that the Commission is statutorily authorized to reduce the level of a
safety and health violation to the de minimis level, 6 and that the practical
effect of reducing a violation to the de minimis level is that no abatement is
then required.87 In that case, Erie Coke Company rejected a United
Steelworkers Union request that the company insert a provision in a
collective bargaining agreement requiring the company to pay for its
employees' protective gloves. 8 The Union filed a complaint with the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, alleging that Erie Coke's

77.
Id.
78.
Symms Fruit Ranch, 242 F.3d at 896.
79.
Id.
80.
Id.
81.
Id. at 896-97.
82.
See id. at 898-99 (emphasis omitted).
83.
Id. at 899 (emphasis in original).
84.
Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1994)) (emphasis in original).
85.
Id.
86.
Reich v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 998 F.2d 134, 139
(3d Cir. 1993).
87.
See id. at 137.
88.
Id. at 135.
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refusal violated a published OSH Act regulation 9 by effectively requiring
its workers to pay for fire resistant gloves needed for work at the coke
ovens.90 The Secretary investigated the complaint, issued a citation for a
non-serious violation, and directed the company to abate the violation. 91
The Secretary did not impose a monetary penalty upon the company. 92
Erie Coke contested the citation and after a hearing the AU affirmed
the citation, concluding that the company violated a published safety
standard 93 requiring employers to provide protective clothing, such as
flame resistant gloves, and assure the use of such protective clothing. 94 The
company appealed the AL's findings and the OSHRC affirmed the finding
of a violation. 95 However, the Commission reduced the severity level of
the offense from non-serious to de minimis, concluding that the violation
had "no direct or immediate relationship to safety or health." 96
The Third Circuit agreed, concluding that Erie employees had not
experienced any direct impairment of safety or health as a result of having
to purchase their own gloves.97 The court ruled that no evidence suggested
that any "employees were wearing torn or otherwise ineffective gloves
beyond their useful life in order to save money, thereby exposing their
hands to possible bums and coke oven emissions. 9 8
The Third Circuit found that the OSH Act creates three levels of
safety violations-serious, non-serious, and de minimis.99 The court
criticized the Secretary for attempting to argue, after twenty years of
acquiescence to the three levels, that the Act creates only two levels of
safety violations-serious and non-serious-and that the de minimis level
is merely a preliminary charging decision under the Secretary's
unreviewable prosecutorial discretion over which the OSHRC has no
authority. 100

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

29 C.F.R. § 1910.1029(h)(1)(ii) (2001).
Reich, 998 F.2d at 135.
See id.
Id.
29 C.F.R. § 1910.1029(h)(1)(ii) (2001).
Reich, 998 F.2d at 135.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 138 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1994)).
Id.
Id. (citing facts in Commision's record).
Id.
Seeid. at 138-39.
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The court cited a long line of Federal Circuit Court precedent to
bolster its argument that three levels were indeed created by the OSH
Act. 1°1
The court's opinion provided a structural analysis of the
Commission's authority under the OSH Act.'0 2 The court stated that under
the Act the Commission possesses the authority to "affirm, modify, or
relief"'10 3
vacate the Secretary's citation, or to direct other appropriate
Under this statutory grant of authority, the court argued, the Commission
should be viewed as a "neutral arbiter" charged by Congress with engaging
regulatory standards
in authoritative fact-finding, applying the Secretary's
4
decisions.'0
final
rendering
and
to those facts,
According to the court, allowing the Commission to reduce the level
of a safety or health violation from serious or non-serious to de minimis
5'
falls within its statutory grant of power under the OSH Act.' The court
analogized the Commission's role as a "neutral arbiter" under the Act to
the power of a criminal court to reduce the criminal offense charged in an
indictment to a lesser-included offense. 0 6 The court stated that in the
criminal law context, this procedure is not seen as an appropriation of the
discretion, but instead a "necessary prerogative of the
prosecutor's
07
court.'

The Fifth Circuit has gone even farther than the Third and Ninth
Circuits, and has reversed an OSHRC decision for failing to enter a Wie
minimis finding. In Phoenix Roofing v. Dole,10 8 an OSHA inspector cited a
roofing company, Phoenix, for failing to set up a "warning line" six feet
from the edge of a roof the company was installing. 0 9 Phoenix admitted it
had not set up a warning line, but argued that such a line was infeasible on
this particular construction project, and that the company had provided
even greater worker protection by employing two employees whose sole

Id. at 138 (citing Phoenix Roofing, Inc. v. Dole, 874 F.2d 1027, 1032 (5th Cir.
101.
1989)); Fluor Constructors, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 861
F.2d 936, 942 (6th Cir. 1988); Donovan v. Daniel Construction Co., 692 F.2d 818, 820-22
(1st Cir. 1982); Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011, 1019 n.10 (7th Cir.
1975); Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 494 F.2d 460, 463 (8th
Cir. 1974).
Reich, 998 F.2d at 138.
102.
Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
103.
Id. (quoting Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499
104.
U.S. 144, 154 (1991)).
Id.
105.
Id.
106.
Id.
107.
Phoenix Roofing, Inc. v. Dole, 874 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1989).
108.
Id. at 1030.
109.
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responsibility was to watch the roof workers, and to warn them if they
approached the edge." Phoenix asked the ALJ to classify the violation de
minimis. However, the AU was unpersuaded and upheld the charge.'11
The OSHRC denied review, and Phoenix appealed." 12
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the AU that Phoenix had technically
violated the applicable OSHA regulation. However, the court found that
the safety protections Phoenix had employed "provided safety equal to or
greater than that imposed by regulation."' 3 Because of this the court
reversed, holding that Phoenix's violation was de minimis as a matter of
law and that the AU (and derivatively the OSHRC) had erred by rejecting
this classification." 4 Thus, in the Fifth Circuit, not only may the OSHRC
re-classify a charge; it must do so under some circumstances.
The First Circuit has stated in dicta that the OSHRC has the authority
to classify a violation as de minimis.1 15 In Donovan v. Daniel Construction
Co.," 6 OSHA inspected a construction site and cited the construction
company for failing to separate open wiring from conducting materials. 117
The company contested the citation, and the AU found no violation." 8
The OSHRC reversed; it found that a violation had occurred, but that the
violation was de minimis because the wiring was well protected. The
OSHRC therefore found that no abatement or penalty was warranted." 9
The Secretary appealed to the First Circuit. The Secretary did not,
however, appeal the OSHRC's assertion of authority to declare a violation
de minimis. 120 On this issue the court, citing to the statutory definition of
de minimis and the statutory directive to the OSHRC to direct "other
appropriate relief," stated that "[t]here is no doubt (and it is agreed) that the
Act gives the Commission authority, in appropriate cases, to reduce
violations to the de minimis category."' 12' The Secretary appealed only the
OSHRC's finding that this particular violation was de minimis. The court
held that it was and affirmed the OSHRC's decision. 122

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.at 1030-31.
Id.at 1032.
Id. at 1029.
Idat 1032.
Id.
See Donovan v. Daniel Constr. Co., 692 F.2d 818, 821 (1st Cir. 1982).
692 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1982).
Id.at 819.
Id.at 820.
Id.
Id. at 821.
Id.
Id. at 822.
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Because the OSHRC's authority to designate a violation as de minimis
was not at issue on appeal to the First Circuit, the court's discussion of the
subject is dicta. Nonetheless, the court's language indicates a strong
probability that the court, if presented squarely with the issue in the future,
would rule that the OSHRC has the authority to designate a violation as de
m •nimis. 123
127
In summary, the First, 124 Third,'2 5 Fifth, 126 and Ninth Circuits have
concluded that the OSHRC possesses the authority to decide that, even
though a safety standard was violated in a technical sense, the violation was
de minimis and no abatement is necessary, and no monetary penalty should
be imposed on the employer. 28 These Circuits have concluded that under
the OSH Act's provision allowing the Commission to issue an order
"directing other appropriate relief,"'129 the Commission is authorized130 to
or abatement.
designate a violation de minimis and to require no penalty
B. THE MINORITY VIEW OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS

The minority view is that once the Secretary of Labor has issued and
proven a violation, the OSHRC may not thereafter reclassify the violation
as de minimis. This view has been advocated by the Secretary of Labor and
adopted by the Seventh Circuit.' 31 It also is the view adopted by the dissent
case of Reich v. OccupationalSafety
in the earlier-discussed Third Circuit
32
1
Commission.
& Health Review
dissent 133
In Reich, Judge Edward R. Becker penned a spirited
concluding that once the Secretary of Labor issues a citation, the
Commission lacks the authority to reclassify the violation as de minimis
and require no abatement. 34 Judge Becker's argument centered on the

See id. at 820-21.
123.
See id. at 821.
124.
See Reich v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 998 F.2d 134,
125.
135 (3d Cir. 1993).
See Phoenix Roofing, Inc. v. Dole, 874 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1989).
126.
See Chao v. Symms Fruit Ranch, Inc., 242 F.3d 894,.898 (9th Cir. 2001).
127.
See id; see also Reich, 998 F.2d at 139.
128.
29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1994) (emphasis added).
129.
See Symms FruitRanch, 242 F.3d at 899; see also Reich, 998 F.2d at 139.
130.
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Herman, 131 F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 1997).
131.
Reich, 998 F.2d at 140 (Becker, J., dissenting). The facts and the Majority
132.
opinion were discussed supra Part I.D.
See id. at 139-45. The dissent's argument that the OSH Act created two
133.
for violations, serious and non-serious, was addressed supra Part I.D.
levels
severity
See Reich, 998 F.2d at 139-45.
134.
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statutory language of 29 U.S.C. § 658(a). 135 According to Judge Becker,
the last clause of this section confers unreviewable prosecutorial discretion
upon the Secretary to determine whether a safety or health violation is de
minimis, and then to decide whether to issue a notice instead of a
6
3

citation.1

Judge Becker argued that allowing the Commission to reclassify a
safety or health violation as de minimis, after the Secretary has decided to
issue a citation instead of a notice in lieu of citation, would allow the
Commission to review the "unreviewable prosecutorial (charging)
discretion," granted to the Secretary under the OSH Act.137 To bolster this
argument, Judge Becker cited the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Cuyahoga Valley Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 138 that under the OSH
Act's division of administrative functions, the Secretary possesses
unreviewable discretion to decide whether to withdraw a previously issued
citation.139 According to Judge Becker, if the Secretary has unreviewable
prosecutorial discretion to determine whether to withdraw a previously
issued citation, even if the Act mandates the issuance of a citation, then it is

"axiomatic" that "the decision to issue a citation for a de minimis violation,

which

135.

the

Act

specifically

makes

discretionary,

must

also

be

The statute reads as follows:
(a)
Authority to issue; grounds; contents; notice in lieu of citation
for de minimis violations

If, upon inspection or investigation, the Secretary or his authorized
representative believes that an employer has violated a requirement of
section 654 of this title, of any standard, rule or order promulgated
pursuant to section 655 of this title, or of any regulations prescribed
pursuant to this chapter, he shall with reasonable promptness issue a
citation to the employer. Each citation shall be in writing and shall
describe with particularity the nature of the violation, including a
reference to the provision of the chapter, standard, rule, regulation, or
order alleged to have been violated. In addition, the citation shall fix a
reasonable time for the abatement of the violation. The Secretary may
prescribe procedures for the issuance of a notice in lieu of a citation
with respect to de minimis violations which have no direct or immediate
relationship to safety or health.
29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1994).
136.
Reich, 998 F.2d at 142 (Becker, J., dissenting). But see Chao v. Symms Fruit
Ranch, Inc., 242 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2001) (criticizing Judge Becker's dissent in Reich).
137.
See Reich, 998 F.2d at 140 (Becker, J.,
dissenting).
138.
Cuyahoga Valley Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 474 U.S. 3 (1985).
139.
See Reich, 998 F.2d at 141 (Becker, J., dissenting) (citing United Transp.
Union, 474 U.S. at 6).
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unreviewable.' 140 According to Judge4 Becker, both decisions fall within
'
the Secretary's prosecutorial function.'
The Seventh Circuit has also concluded that only the Secretary may
142
classify a charge as de minimis. In CaterpillarInc. v. Herman, the court
held that the OSHRC is not authorized to designate a safety or health
violation de minimis and disregard it. 143 Instead, the Commission must
merely decide whether a safety violation occurred, and then impose an
appropriate penalty. 44
During the course of a bitter strike at Caterpillar's plant, in Aurora,
Illinois, the local chapter of the United Autoworkers Union (UAW or
145
These records
Union) requested copies of Caterpillar's injury logs.
who had
employees
Caterpillar
of
numbers
badge
and
included the names
146
use this
might
Union
the
Fearing
continued to work despite the strike.
information to harass or physically harm the strikebreakers, Caterpillar
provided the logs to the Union with employee names and badge numbers
blacked out. 147
The OSH Act issue arose in this case because the UAW made its
request under a published safety regulation in its capacity as a
representative of the Caterpillar employees. If the Union had requested the
records under the National Labor Relations Act, in its capacity as the
employees' collective bargaining representative, the employer would have
been justified in redacting the names and badge numbers of the
strikebreakers.14 8 However, the Union instead requested the records
pursuant to an OSHA regulation which arguably entitled an employee's49
"representative" to receive non-redacted copies of the records.
Caterpillar nonetheless refused to provide non-redacted copies of the logs.
The Secretary of Labor cited Caterpillar for "willfully violating a
regulation"'150 and imposed afine of $20,000.151

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Reich, 998 F.2d at 141 (Becker, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
See id.
Caterpillar Inc., v. Herman, 131 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 668.
Id.
Id. at 667.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Chicago Tribune Co. v. NLRB, 79 F.3d 604 (7th Cir. 1996)).
See id. at 667 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1904/7(b)(1)).
Id.
Id.
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Caterpillar contested both the citation and the fine. Caterpillar raised
three defenses.' 52 One of these defenses was that the violation was too
trivial to-justify a monetary penalty - i.e., that the ALJ should designate the
violation de minimis and withdraw the fine.' 53 The ALJ dismissed two of
Caterpillar's defenses on the pleadings, and dismissed the de minimis
defense after a hearing.' 54 The AU ruled that Caterpillar had violated a
published safety and health regulation, but concluded that Caterpillar's
redaction of employee names and badge numbers did not diminish the
employee's level of protection. 55 The AU found the $20,000 penalty
excessive and reduced the fine to $5,000.156 The Commission chose not to
review the ALJ's decision, thereby adopting it as the final agency decision.
Caterpillar appealed to the Seventh Circuit, again asserting all three
7
defenses.

The Seventh Circuit opinion was authored by Judge Frank
Easterbrook, Judge Richard Posner and Judge Michael Kanne joined the
opinion. The court ultimately found that the ALJ should have considered
one of the defenses that had been dismissed on the pleadings, and the court
remanded for further findings of fact on that defense. 158 The court rejected
outright, however, Caterpillar's de minimis defense. Instead, the court
"accept[ed] the Secretary's view that the Commission cannot
label a
violation de minimis and disregard it; that would transfer the Secretary's
discretion . . . to the Commission."' 59 The Seventh Circuit recognized that
"[t]rivial violations deserve trivial fines,"'' 60 but, like Shylock invoking the
law in support of his demand for a pound of flesh, 161 the court held that the
Secretary "is entitled to insist on some exaction even for the equivalent of
1' 62

jaywalking.'

152.

Id.

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 667-68.
Id. at 668.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 669-70.

160.
161.

Id.

153.

159.

162.

See id.

Id. at 668 (citation omitted).
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1.

Caterpilla,rInc., 131 F.3d at 668.
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III. ANALYSIS
The remainder of this article focuses on the narrow legal question of
whether the OSHRC can designate an occupational safety and health
violation as de minimis and declare that, even though an OSH Act violation
has occurred in a technical sense, no penalty is warranted and no abatement
is necessary. Currently, the federal circuit courts are divided on this
question. 163 Resolution of this issue requires consideration of four subissues, each of which will be addressed in turn: (1) whether the OSH Act
creates three levels of severity for safety and health violations-serious,
non-serious, and de minimis; (2) whether the Commission possesses the
statutory authority under the OSH Act to label a safety and health violation
de minimis; (3) whether the Secretary's interpretation of the OSH Act is
unreasonable; and (4) whether public policy favors extending authority to
the OSHRC to designate safety and health violations de minimis and
require no abatement.
A. THE OSH ACT ESTABLISHES THREE LEVELS OF SEVERITY: SERIOUS, NONSERIOUS, AND DE MINIMIS

The majority of the circuits that have considered the issue have
concluded that Congress intended to establish three severity levels for
occupational safety and health violations-serious, non-serious, and de

See Chao v. Symms Fruit Ranch, Inc., 242 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2001)
163.
(concluding that the OSHRC can designate an occupational safety and health violation as de
minimis and declare that even though an OSH Act violation has occurred in a technical
sense, that no penalty is warranted); Reich v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 998 F.2d 134, 138-39 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that the OSH Act gives the
Commission authority to reduce safety violations to the de minimis level); Donovan v.
Daniel Constr. Co., 692 F.2d 818, 821 (1st Cir. 1982) ("[t]here is no doubt (and it is agreed)
that the Act gives the Commission authority, in appropriate cases, to reduce violations to the
de minimis category."); Phoenix Roofing, Inc. v. Dole, 874 F.2d 1027, 1031-32 (5th Cir.
1989) (stating that a violation of a safety standard can be classified de minimis resulting in a
finding that, even though technically a violation occurred, no penalty should be imposed and
no abatement is necessary). But see Caterpillar, Inc. v. Herman, 131 F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir.
1997) (holding that the Commission lacks the authority to reduce violations to a de minimis
category once the Secretary has issued a citation and further stating that this would transfer
the Secretary's prosecutorial discretion to the Commission); Reich, 998 F.2d at 140 (Becker,
J., dissenting) (stating that the OSH Act grants the Secretary unreviewable prosecutorial
discretion either to issue a citation or a notice in lieu of citation for de minimis violations
and that the Commission lacks the authority to reduce a safety violation to a de minimis
level once the Secretary has issued a citation for a serious or non-serious offense).
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minimis.164 The minority view is that de minimis safety and health
violations were intended as a mere subset of non-serious violations, and as
such, only two
severity levels-serious and non-serious, were created by
165
the OSH Act.
We believe that de minimis safety violations are sui generis and are
mutually exclusive of the set of either serious safety violations or nonserious safety violations. 166 This argument finds support in the structure of
the OSH Act itself. The Act separately defines de minimis safety violations
as those "violations
which have no direct or immediate relationship to
167
safety or health.'
This argument can be illustrated in terms of a Venn diagram. Imagine
the three separate classifications-serious,
non-serious, and de minimis, as
168
three separate eccentric circles.
M

-

Figure 1

See cases cited supra note 163.
See Reich, 998 F.2d at 141-42 (Becker, J., dissenting).
But see id. at 142 (Becker J., dissenting).
29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1994).
See Figure 1.
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Serious safety violations, since they are defined in the Act, occupy the
first separate circle unto themselves. Non-serious safety violations, since
they are not separately defined within the Act consist of the set of safety
violations that do not fit within the serious violation definition,' 69 and
occupy a second separate circle. Finally, de minimis violations, since they
have their own separate and distinct definition within the Act, 170 occupy a
third separate circle. Thus, in finite terms, serious, non-serious, and de
minimis safety violations exist either by express inclusion in an OSH Act
definition, or by implication by omission. Whether these levels of severity
can be viewed as mutually exclusive of one another depends upon whether
they are defined in the Occupational Safety and Health Act or not.
171
In Reich v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission,
Judge Edward R. Becker argued in dissent that Congress created only two
severity levels-serious and non-serious-under the OSH Act. 172 Judge
Becker argued that de minimis violations were intended merely as a subset
of non-serious violations over which the Secretary has sole discretion to
decide whether to cite an employer for a violation
or to instead issue a
173
notice in lieu of a citation for de minimis violations.
This interpretation cannot be justified under the OSH Act. According
to Judge Becker, whether Congress intended to establish separate severity
levels depends upon whether Congress defined a severity level, or by
negative implication failed to define a severity level, within the OSH
Act. 174 Judge Becker correctly noted that Congress expressly defined what
comprises a serious safety violation, but either intentionally or
inadvertently failed to define non-serious safety violations. 175 Judge
Becker inferred from this that, by implication, non-serious violations are
comprised of the set of all violations not fitting within the set definition of
serious violations 176 _ i.e., non-serious violations
are, "as their name
177
implies, all of those violations that are not serious."'

169. See Reich v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 998 F.2d 134,
dissenting).
142 (3d Cir. 1993) (Becker, J.,
170.
29 U.S.C. § 658 (a).
171.
998 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1993).
172.
Id. at 141-42 (Becker, J.,
dissenting).
173.
Id. at 142.
174.
See generally Reich, 998 F.2d at 142 (Becker, J.,
dissenting).
175.
See id. at 141-142 (3d Cir. 1993) (Becker, J.,dissenting) (citing 29 U.S.C. §
666(b) (1994)).
176. Id. at 142 (Becker, J., dissenting).
177. Id.
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However, Judge Becker went a step further. He argued that because
the OSH Act definition of de minimis violations is found only in a
provision that gives the Secretary discretion in making charging decisions,
178
Congress must not have intended to create a separate severity level.

Judge Becker concluded from this that the statute creates only two severity

levels-serious and non-serious-and that de minimis
violations were
79
merely intended to be a subset of non-serious violations. 1
As Judge Becker acknowledges, the OSH Act expressly defines de
minimis safety violations.180 The Act describes de minimis violations as
"violations which have no direct or immediate relationship to safety or
health."' 8 ' This description itself "determine[s] or identiflies] the essential
meaning of'' 8 2 the term de minimis violation. The fact that Congress
placed the definition in a somewhat odd location within the statute does not
mean that Congress did not intend to create a third category of violations.
Additionally, because a de minimis violation has its own definition, 183 it
presumably was not intended to be within a subset of non-serious
violations. De minimis violations, therefore, must be a severity level unto

178.

Id. at 141-142 (Becker, J., dissenting). Judge Becker argued:
The Acts only reference to a de minimis violation, and the reference on
which the traditional view relies, is found in § 658(a), a provision that
by its terms is concerned solely with the Secretary's prosecutorial
charging decisions. In contrast, the definitions for serious and not
serious violations are located in § 666, a provision that governs the
assessment of civil and criminal penalties and which expressly provides
a role for the Commission in assessing those penalties. From a purely
structural standpoint, it seems unlikely that if Congress intended to
establish three severity levels it would have established them in
completely separate sections, sections that are dissimilar in terms of
their location within the Act and their subject matter. Moreover, it
seems unlikely that Congress would place a definition for one of the
primary issues in adjudication in a section which, in all other aspects,
concerns only conduct by the Secretary that is wholly unreviewable.
Congress never intended de minimis to serve as a level of severity for
purposes of adjudication. Rather, as I read the Act, it establishes only
two severity levels for a cited violation: (1) "serious violation" and (2)
"violation determined not serious."
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
179.
Reich, 998 F.2d 134, 141-42 (Becker, J., dissenting).
180.
See id. at 142. Webster's Dictionary defines the word define as "to determine
or identify the essential qualities or meaning of . . . [or] to discover and set forth the
meaning of (as a word)." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, 333 (9th ed.
1983).
181.
29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1994).
182.
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 333 (9th ed. 1983).
183.
29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1994).
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themselves, mutually exclusive of either serious or non-serious
violations.' 84 Thus, the OSH Act creates three levels of severity-serious,
non-serious, and de minimis.
B. THE COMMISSION POSSESSES THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY UNDER THE
OSH ACT TO LABEL A SAFETY AND HEALTH VIOLATION DE MINIMIS

The OSHRC possesses the statutory authority to designate a safety
and health violation de minimis and require no penalty or abatement even
though an OSH Act violation has technically occurred. 185 The structure of
the OSH Act itself compels this conclusion.
Under the OSH Act, the Commission is authorized to "issue an order,
based on findings of fact, affirming, modifying, or vacating the Secretary's
citation or proposed penalty, or directing other appropriaterelief."'186 The
Commission's authority to direct other appropriaterelief has been referred
to as the Commission's residual remedial power.1 87 It is under this
statutory grant of power that the Commission is authorized to reduce the
severity level of a safety violation from serious or non-serious to de
minimis.188 The power of the Commission to reduce a violation to the de
minimis category can best be analogized to the power of a court to reduce a
criminal offense charged in the indictment to a lesser-included offense.' 89
The Occupational Safety and Health Act requires employers to
provide their employees with a worksite that is "free from recognized
hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical

184.
Figure 1, supra note 168.
185.
Chao v. Symms Fruit Ranch, Inc., 242 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2001).
186.
Id. at 898-99 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1994)).
187.
See Reich v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 998 F.2d 134,
143 (3d Cir. 1993) (Becker, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
188.
See Symms FruitRanch, 242 F.3d at 899 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1994))
(emphasis added).
189.
See id. (quoting Reich v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 998
F.2d 134, 139 (3d Cir. 1993)). The majority in Reich crystallized its reasoning by
concluding:
The Commission has the statutory authority to affirm, modify, or vacate
the Secretary's citation, or to direct other appropriate relief. Its action in
reducing the violation to de minimis status clearly falls within that grant
of power. The reduction of the offense level is analogous to the power
of a court to reduce a criminal offense to a lesser level than the one
charged in an indictment. That traditional procedure has not been
considered to be a usurpation of prosecutorial discretion, but rather a
necessary prerogative of the court.
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harm to [their] employees ... [and] comply with occupational safety and
health standards promulgated under [the OSH Act] . . . 190 If the
Secretary issues a citation to an employer for a serious violation for failing
to provide its employees with a safe place of employment, or for failing to
comply with an occupational safety and health standard, the statute
provides that the employer must be assessed a monetary penalty for each
separate violation.' 9' Conversely, if the Secretary issues a citation to an
employer for a non-serious failure to provide its employees with a safe
worksite, or for failure to comply with a safety and health standard, the
statute provides that the employer may be assessed a monetary penalty. 9 2
Thus, in the case of serious violations, there is no discretion. If the
employer is cited for seriously violating a safety or health standard, the
employer must be assessed a fine. 19 3 Alternatively, if the employer is cited
for a non-serious violation, there is discretion, and the employer may be
assessed a fme.194
Under the OSH Act, the Secretary (or his designee) is authorized to
conduct inspections or investigations and, thereafter, to issue citations to
employers who are violating safety standards or regulations under the
Act. 195 This provision states that "the citation shall fix a reasonable time
for the abatement of the violation.' ' 196 Additionally, the section states that
the Secretary "may prescribe procedures for the issuance of a notice in lieu
of a. citation with respect to de minimis violations which have no direct or
immediate relationship to safety or health."' 97

190.
29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1994).
191.
See Chao v. Symms Fruit Ranch, Inc., 242 F.3d 894, 897-98 (9th Cir. 2001)
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 666(b) (1994)).
192.
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 666(c)).
193.
See generally id.
194.
See id.
195.
See id. at 898 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1994)).
196.
29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (emphasis added).
197.
Id.
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The Secretary argues that under the OSH Act, once a citation is issued
for a violation of a health or safety standard and the violation is established,
the Commission lacks the authority to designate the violation de minimis
and require no penalty or abatement. 198 The problem with the Secretary's
interpretation becomes readily apparent when sections 666 and 658(a) are
juxtaposed.' 99 If an employer is cited for a non-serious violation under
section 666(c), there is no discretion to allow the employer to forego

abatement of the violation.200 As long as the Secretary has issued a citation

to the employer instead of a notice in lieu of citation, the employer must
abate the violation under section 658(a), 20 1 no matter how trivial the
violation.2 °2 Thus, unless the OSHRC is authorized to reduce the severity
level of the violation to the de minimis status, the employer must always
abate the violation, and no discretion exists to allow non-abatement even

198.
199.
200.

Chao v. Symms Fruit Ranch, Inc., 242 F.3d 894, 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 898.
The statute states:
(c) Citation for violation determined not serious

Any employer who has received a citation for a violation of the
requirements of section 654 of this title, of any standard, rule, or order
promulgated pursuant to section 655 of this title, or of regulations
prescribed pursuant to this chapter, and such violation is specifically
determined not to be of a serious nature, may be assessed a civil penalty
of up to $7,000 for each such violation.
29 U.S.C. § 666(c) (1994). See also Chao v. Symms Fruit Ranch, Inc., 242 F.3d 894, 89798 (9th Cir. 2001).
201.
The relevant portion of the statute reads:
(a) Authority to issue; grounds; contents; notice in lieu of citation for
de minimis violations
If, upon inspection or investigation, the Secretary or his authorized
representative believes that an employer has violated a requirement of
section 654 of this title, of any standard, rule or order promulgated
pursuant to section 655 of this title, or of any regulations prescribed
pursuant to this chapter, he shall with reasonable promptness issue a
citation to the employer. Each citation shall be in writing and shall
describe with particularity the nature of the violation, including a
reference to the provision of the chapter, standard, rule, regulation, or
order alleged to have been violated. In addition, the citation shallfix a
reasonable time for the abatement of the violation. The Secretary may
prescribe procedures for the issuance of a notice in lieu of a citation
with respect to de minimis violations which have no direct or immediate
relationship to safety or health.
29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (emphasis added); see also Chao v. Symms Fruit Ranch, Inc., 242 F.3d
894, 898 (9th Cir. 2001).
202.
See Symms Fruit Ranch, 242 F.3d 894 at 898.
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for de minimis violations that the Commission
finds "have no direct or
20 3
immediate relationship to safety or health.,
The Commission is statutorily authorized to adjudicate contested
citations involving alleged violations of the OSH Act.2°
Under this
authorization, the Commission must possess the authority to rule that the
OSH Act was not violated even if, in some purely technical or literal sense,
an employer violated an occupational safety or health standard.0 5
Accepting the Secretary's view "would mean that once she issues a citation
for a violation of a safety standard and establishes such a violation, the
Commission has no authority to hold that the violation was so negligible or
harmless that remediation is unnecessary.,' 20 6 Accepting this position
would require employers to abate any violation for any citation that an
OSHA inspector issued and proved, no matter how insignificant.
A return to the ladder hypothetical in this article's introduction is
illustrative. In this situation, the moment the Secretary (compliance
investigator) issued a citation and established that a non-serious violation
of an occupational safety and health regulation occurred, the employer's
only options would be either to contest the finding of a violation or abate
the violation. The employer would not have the option of admitting a
technical violation but arguing that the violation was insignificant and put
no employees at risk. This is because under the Secretary's interpretation,
the Commission lacks the authority to later reduce the violation to the de
minimis status and allow the employer to forego abatement of the violation.
This result is contrary to the structure and purpose of the OSH Act. If
after an evidentiary hearing the OSHRC finds that a technical violation
occurred, but that the violation bore no discernible relation to workplace
safety, the OSHRC should be empowered to find a de minimis violation
and to decline to order abatement. Ordering abatement under these
circumstances is a waste of resources - it imposes a cost upon employers
but delivers no safety benefit to employees.
Whether the technical
violation is a thirteen-inch ladder rung or a partially guarded, unengaged
power take-off shaft, the OSHRC should be permitted to say, in effect, "No
harm, no foul."

203.
204.
205.
206.

29 U.S.C. § 658(a).
29 U.S.C. § 659(c).
See Symms FruitRanch, 242 F.3d at 898.
Id.
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C. THE SECRETARY'S INTERPRETATION OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH ACT IS UNREASONABLE

1. The ReasonablenessStandard
The Secretary of Labor's argument that the Commission lacks the
authority to characterize a safety violation as de minimis and to order no
penalty or abatement is unreasonable. 2 7 The Secretary argues one
interpretation of the OSH Act while the OSHRC advances an interpretation
that directly contradicts the Secretary's interpretation.2 8 In situations
where the statutory interpretations of the Secretary and the Commission
conflict, the court must defer to the Secretary's reasonable
2°9 In addressing these types
interpretation.
of cases, courts apply the
210
test.
Chevron
Ordinarily, if an agency is entrusted to administer a statute, a court
reviewing the agency's construction of the statute must first give effect to
the "unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." 21' If the court finds
that Congress has not directly addressed the precise question presented, a
court may not substitute its own interpretation of the statute for the
reasonable interpretation of the agency's administrator."' Instead, the
court should defer to the agency's construction of the statute as long as that
interpretation is reasonable.2 3
If a court finds that an agency's
construction of its own regulation is reasonable, then the agency's
interpretation is entitled to "substantial deference, 214 but such deference is
required only if the Secretary's statutory construction is reasonable.2 5 An
interpretation is unreasonable
if it is "'arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
216
contrary to statute.'

207.
Id. at 896-97.
See id. at 897.
208.
209.
See id. (quoting Herman v. Tidewater Pac., Inc., 160 F.3d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir.
1998)) (emphasis added).
210.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
For a discussion of the judicial and academic reaction to Chevron, see Richard A. Bales,
Compulsory Employment Arbitrationand the EEOC, 27 PEPP. L. REv. 1, 26-28 (1999).
211.
Chao v. Symms Fruit Ranch, Inc., 242 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-23).
212.
Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).
213.
Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44).
214.
Id. (citing Martin, 499 U.S. at 150).
215.
Id. (citing Martin, 499 U.S. at 158) (emphasis added).
216.
Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).
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2. Why the Secretary'sInterpretationof the OSH Act is Unreasonable
The Secretary's interpretation of the OSH Act is unreasonable for
three reasons. First, the Secretary's construction of the Act would require
finding that the OSH Act establishes only two severity levels for safety
violations - serious and non-serious - thereby excluding the de minimis
classification altogether from consideration by the Commission." 7 Second,
this interpretation would call into question the Commission's authority to
determine the severity level of a safety violation at all: if the Commission
cannot downgrade a violation from non-serious to de minimis, then it is
unclear whether the Commission has the statutory authority to downgrade a
serious violation to a non-serious violation. Third, and most importantly,
acceptance of this position would mean that once the Secretary cites an
employer for violation of a safety standard and establishes the violation, the
OSHRC is powerless to then hold that the violation was so "negligible or
harmless that remediation is unnecessary."'2 18 This is inconsistent with the
text of the OSH Act, the purpose of which is to promote workplace safety.
If abatement of a technical violation does not enhance workplace safety,
there is no statutory justification for ordering abatement.
In Cuyahoga Valley Railway v. United Transportation Union,2 19 a per
curiam summary disposition, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
the Secretary of Labor possesses unreviewable prosecutorial discretion to
drop a citation for a safety violation once issued.22 ° In the Third Circuit
case of Reich v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission,22 1
Judge Edward R. Becker argued in dissent that the Cuyahoga Court
interpreted the OSH Act as granting the Secretary unreviewable
prosecutorial discretion to either issue a citation for a safety violation or
issue a notice in lieu of a citation.222 Further, Judge Becker argued that to
give the Commission the authority to reduce the level of a safety violation
to the de minimis level would allow the Commission to review the

217.

See Reich v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 998 F.3d 134,

218.
219.
220.

Chao v. Symms Fruit Ranch, Inc., 242 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2001).
Cuyahoga Valley Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 474 U.S. 3 (1985).
See Symms Fruit Ranch, 242 F.3d at 899 (citing Cuyahoga Valley, 474 U.S. at

142-43 (3d Cir. 1993) (Becker, J., dissenting).

6-7).
221.
Reich v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 998 F.2d 134 (3d Cir.
1993).
222.
See Symms FruitRanch, 242 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Reich, 998
F.2d at 142 (3d Cir. 1993) (Becker, J., dissenting)).
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Secretary's unreviewable decision, and usurp the Secretary's prosecutorial
discretion. Judge Becker argued this should not be allowed. 23
However, the Ninth Circuit has distinguished Cuyahoga by finding it
merely stands for the proposition that the Secretary of Labor's discretion to
withdraw a citation is analogous to a civil plaintiffs discretion to withdraw
her claim, or a criminal prosecutor's discretion to drop charges.224 In other
words, just because Congress gave the Secretary the authority to drop a
charge or to label a charge de minimis does not necessarily mean that
Congress intended to deprive the OSHRC of the authority to label a finding
de minimis. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit compared the Secretary's
discretion in these circumstances to the "unremarkable general proposition"
that a court cannot require a civil plaintiff to continue to prosecute a case
against her will.2 25 Therefore, Judge Becker's reliance on the Cuyahoga
decision for the proposition that the OSH Act grants the Secretary
unreviewable prosecutorial discretion to either issue a citation for a safety
violation, or issue a notice in lieu of a citation, is misplaced. The case is
neither on point nor analogous.
D. PUBLIC POLICY FAVORS EXTENDING AUTHORITY TO THE COMMISSION

As stated in this article's background section, two policies justified
Congress' enactment of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. First,
Congress wanted to reduce human suffering and death from workplace
injuries and illnesses.226 Second, Congress wanted to counteract the
economic impacts resulting from occupational injuries and illnesses.227
1. Extending Authority to the Commission Will Not Increase Workplace
Injuries
First, allowing the Commission to reduce safety and health violations
from serious or non-serious to de minimis will not increase workplace
injuries. Empowering the Secretary to cite employers for serious and non-

223.
Id. at 899.
224.
See id.
225.
See id.
226.
See S. REP. No. 91-1282, at 2 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5178.
See 29 U.S.C. § 651(a) (1994) ("personal injuries and illnesses arising out of
227.
work situations impose a substantial burden upon, and are a hindrance to, interstate
commerce in terms of lost production, wage loss, medical expenses, and disability
compensation payments.").
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serious violations serves as a deterrent to employers who would otherwise
violate the OSH Act regulations. It is only under limited circumstances
that an employer may violate safety standards and avoid both penalty and
abatement under the de minimis defense. 228 De minimis safety violations,
by definition, have no "direct or immediate relationship to safety or
health., 229 Allowing the Commission to reduce a certain limited number of
safety and health violations to the de minimis level such that no penalty or
abatement is required will not encourage employers who would otherwise
abide by the letter of the regulation to violate the regulation.
Employers who fail to abide by the regulation risk being found liable
for a serious or non-serious safety violation, paying a penalty, abating the
violation, and haxing their safety records history diminished. These
sanctions are sufficient deterrents to employers to prevent them from
violating safety regulations. Just knowing that they may, in a certain
limited number of situations, be absolved from liability under a de minimis
defense will not increase safety violations or workplace injuries. Thus,
allowing the Commission to classify certain safety violations de minimis,
even though technically an OSH Act standard has been violated, will not
result in an increase in workplace injuries.
2. Extending Authority to the Commission Makes Economic Sense
One congressional purpose for enacting the Occupational Safety and
Health Act was to counteract the economic impacts resulting from
occupational injuries and illnesses.23 ° Some of these economic impacts
included lost production, wages, medical expenses, and disability
compensation payments.
From an economic efficiency standpoint it
follows that, if an employer violates a technical safety standard and is cited
by the Secretary for the violation, but that the violation has "no direct or
immediate relationship to safety or health,, 23 1 to nevertheless impose a fine
or require abatement is counterproductive and, derivatively, contrary to the
purpose of the statute.
An abatement requirement in instances where abatement does not
improve workplace safety can only be viewed as punitive in nature. This
makes little sense, because de minimis violators are by definition the least
deserving, among categories of violators, of punishment. Moreover, as

228.

See Phoenix Roofing, Inc. v. Dole, 874 F.2d 1027, 1034 (5th Cir. 1989).

230.

See 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1994).

229.
231.

29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1994).
29 U.S.C. § 658(a).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 22-3

discussed in Part III-B above, abatement in this context results in a
deadweight loss in productivity: the employer must pay for the abatement
and absorb the lost opportunity costs associated with implementation of the
abatement, but there is no corresponding benefit to employees in the form
of enhanced workplace safety.
Additionally, allowing the OSHRC to affirm a citation for a safety
violation but to designate it as de minimis reduces litigation expenses for
both employers and the Department of Labor. In fact, the Secretary's own
regulation indicates that reducing litigation expenses is worthwhile. 32
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §§ 2200.200 - .211, employers with cases involving
non-complex issues of law or fact that fall under an aggregate proposed
penalty of less than $10,000 can opt for an "E-Z Trial., 233 This E-Z Trial
does not allow complaints, answers, pleadings, discovery (except in certain
limited circumstances), or interlocutory appeals. 234 Hearings are informal
and parties argue their case orally before a Judge instead of submitting
written briefs, and the Judge usually delivers oral decisions from the
bench.235
The informal adjudicatory process contained in the E-Z Trial
demonstrates that it makes economic sense to allow the OSHRC to affirm a
citation for a safety violation but to designate it as de minimis. In such an
instance, the E-Z Trial method operates at its optimum. Usually, these
cases involve non-complex issues of law or fact and almost by definition
fall well under the statutory maximum $10,000 for qualification for E-Z
Trial use.236 Thus the Secretary's own regulation allowing a simplified
adjudicatory model demonstrates the economic benefits to both the
Department of Labor and employers from allowing the Commission to
affirm a citation for a safety violation but to designate it as de minimis.
CONCLUSION

Currently, a split exists in the Federal Circuit Courts concerning
whether the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
possesses the authority to designate a safety and health violation de minimis
and require no abatement, even after the Secretary of Labor has issued a
citation for the violation. Indeed, the majority of Federal Circuit Courts to

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

See 29 C.F.R. § 2200.200(a) (2001).
Id. § 2200.202.
Id. § 2200.200.
Id.
See id. § 2200.202.
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417

address this issue have concluded that the Commission does in fact possess
this authority.
This article demonstrates that the Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission has the statutory authority to designate an
occupational safety and health violation as de minimis and declare that,
even though an OSH Act violation has occurred in a technical sense, no
penalty is warranted and no abatement is necessary though the Secretary
has issued a citation. Moreover, there are sound policy reasons for
recognizing the OSHRC's authority in this regard. Requiring an abatement
that will not enhance workplace safety and imposes a deadweight loss on
employers is inefficient. The OSHRC should have the authority to find:
"No harm, no foul."

